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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the determinants 
for future-oriented information in the UK annual report narrative sections, in 
addition to empirically examining the association between levels of disclosure, 
as a proxy for asymmetric information, and corporate dividend policy. 
Design/methodology/approach: We use tobit and logit regression models to 
empirically examine the association between levels of future-oriented 
information (the dependent variable) and firm-specific and corporate governance 
characteristics (the independent variables). We also use the same regression 
technique to investigate the association between dividend policy (the dependent 
variable) and levels of future-oriented information and other control variables 
(independent variables).  
Findings: Our paper contributes to the disclosure studies in two crucial ways. 
First, it offers the first evidence that levels of future-oriented information is 
determined by firm size. Second, it offers the first UK evidence of the 
association between levels of corporate narrative reporting (as a measure of 
asymmetric information) and dividend policy. Our results show that dividends 
are positively related to corporate narrative reporting. 
Practical implications: Our results suggest that UK companies use narrative 
reporting and dividends to signal their future prospects. Consequently, regulators 
should pay more attention to what is (and should be) reported in these narrative 
sections of the annual reports. 
Originality/value: Judging from previous literature review, this paper offers the  
first empirical evidence to the drivers of future-oriented disclosure in the UK. 
The authors also aim to be the first to empirically examine the association 
between narrative reporting and dividend policy.  
Keywords: Narrative reporting; Future-oriented information; Dividend policy; 
United Kingdom. 
 
Classifications: Research paper 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of 1960s, numerous accounting studies have been 
devoted to investigate corporate financial disclosure. Many of these use the 
disclosure index and the manual content analysis approach to measure disclosure; 
others use subjective ratings like AIMR-FAF US analyst scores. Few among 
them, however, apply computer-based content analysis to study corporate 
reporting.  
 
Hussainey et al. (2003) are considered among the first to investigate this 
issue in developed markets, in particular in UK. They have invested heavily in 
developing a new method for scoring a large sample on corporate narrative 
reports. Hussainey et al. contribute to the literature by using the Nudist software 
as well as the market based accounting research. They provide evidence that 
future-oriented information in annual report narratives contains value-relevant 
information for investors to better forecast future earnings. Their work is 
considered as one of the key factors allowing financial accounting research to 
move forward in the UK (Beattie, 2005).  
 
In a recent study, Hussainey and Walker (2009) offer evidence that 
future-oriented information and dividend propensity are substitute forms of 
financial communication channels that UK high-growth firms can use for 
signalling value-relevant information to investors. For the sake of completeness, 
the present paper empirically examines what drives the future-oriented content 
of the UK annual report narratives. It also empirically examines the potential 
application of this class of information by UK firms in reducing agency costs. 
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We can consider at length the works of Hussainey et al. (2003) and 
Hussainey and Walker (2009) in the present paper for two main reasons. First, 
while future-oriented information has always been found to be useful for 
investors in the UK stock market, the nature of these scores is still unknown and 
what drives UK firms to voluntarily report this type of information in their 
annual report narratives. Second, Hussainey and Walker (2009) provide 
evidence that future-oriented information and dividend propensity are substitute 
forms for communicating value relevant information to investors. Their results 
are consistent with signalling theory, but not consistent with pecking order 
theory (Deshmukh, 2005). In addition, prior US research on the association 
between asymmetric information and dividends, such as Deshmukh ( 2003; 
2005) and Li and Zhao (2008), still offer mixed results. Consequently, the 
association between dividend and levels of future-oriented information (as a 
measure of information asymmetry) remains a challenge and source of much 
debate. It is, therefore, one of the main issues to be empirically examined in the 
present paper.  
 
Based on the above discussion, this paper contributes to two streams of 
research. First, this study adds to the growing research into determinants of 
corporate voluntary disclosure. Second, our paper contributes to the literature on 
the association between corporate disclosure policy and firms' dividend policy.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews prior 
research and develops the research hypotheses. The third section describes the 
data and research methods, followed by a fourth section, in which the empirical 
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results are analysed. The paper ends with conclusions and suggestions for future 
research. 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
DETERMINANTS OF FUTURE- ORIENTED INFORMATION 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS 
In a series of papers, Hussainey et al. (2003), Schleicher et al.(2007) and 
Hussainey and Walker (2009) provide evidence that future-oriented information 
in the annual report narratives contain value relevant information for investors to 
better anticipate future earnings. Their evidence is consistent with signalling 
theory. However, the authors did not explain in their papers what drives UK 
firms to voluntarily disclose this class of information in their reports.  
 
The relationship between corporate disclosure and firm-specific and 
corporate governance characteristics has attracted major attention in prior 
research. A consistent finding across prior research is that four firm 
characteristics (firm size; gearing; profitability; and risk) and two corporate 
governance characteristics (number of non-executive directors on board and 
insider ownership) are the key drivers for corporate voluntary disclosure.  
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) offer a meta-analysis of the results of 23 
separate studies of the association between the levels of disclosure in the annual 
report and firm characteristics since 1961. They find that only four variables 
have a significant positive association with disclosure levels, namely: firm size, 
exchange listing status, audit firm size and leverage. In the present study, we 
focus only on firm size and leverage for a number of reasons. First, audit firm 
size is not electronically available for a large sample of firms at the time of 
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undertaking the analyses and also we argue that including non-executive 
directors in the models helps to capture the monitoring role that the audit 
committee provides. Second, the sample is based on all UK listed companies 
with no reported evidence in previous literature between disclosure levels and 
listing status (see for example, Botosan, 1997).  
FIRM SIZE 
The positive association between corporate disclosure and firm size is 
suggested by the signalling theory. This theory proposes that large firms tend to 
attract financial analysts and are more subject to greater demand for value- 
relevant information by financial analysts and their investors. In addition, these 
firms are more likely to have the funds for the cost of producing information for 
the user of annual reports.  
LEVERAGE 
Signalling theory is also used to explain the positive association between 
leverage and the levels of corporate disclosure. For example, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that highly leveraged firms have more monitoring costs. 
One possible response for highly leveraged firms to reduce these costs is to 
report more future-oriented information in their annual report narratives in order 
to convey value relevant information to satisfy the need of creditors.  
PROFITABILITY 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) in their Meta analysis also find that there is 
considerable empirical evidence on the association between disclosure and 
profitability. However, the results of these studies are mixed. In particular, 
signalling theory suggests that profitable firms have an incentive to disclose 
more information to signal their favourable results to the stock market 
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participants. Therefore, one can anticipate that profitable firms are more likely to 
disclose future-oriented information in their annual report narratives. On the 
other hand, Schleicher et al. (2007) offer evidence that the publication of future-
oriented information in the annual report narrative sections is considered a key 
source of information for unprofitable firms, but not for profitable firms. 
Consequently, the study expects a negative association between levels of future-
oriented information in annual report narratives and the profitability of the firm.  
RISK 
Finally, prior research argues that increasing levels of corporate 
disclosure should reduce firm's risk (please see Espionsa and Trombetta, 2007). 
This is because rich disclosure environment should enhance stock liquidity and 
decrease its risk either by reducing transaction costs or increasing the demand on 
the stock and hence reducing the expected returns on the stock (Mouselli and 
Hussainey, 2009). As a result, a negative association between levels of future-
oriented information and firm's risk is expected.  
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS 
BOARD COMPOSITION 
 
The association between corporate voluntary disclosure and board 
composition is not clear, in spite of extensive empirical research on this relation,  
the results are mixed.  For example, the findings in Beasley (1996), Chen and 
Jaggi (2000), Patelli and Prencipe (2007) and Li et al. (2008) support a positive 
association between board composition and corporate voluntary disclosure, 
while other studies (see Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) find a 
negative association. Ho and Wong (2001), Lakhal (2007) and Brammer and 
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Pavelin (2006) find no statistically significant association between the two 
variables. It must be noted that from the above-mentioned studies, only Lakhal 
(2007) implicitly examines the association between future-oriented information 
and board composition in France. The findings of Lakhal’s study is in line with 
expectation, this is particularly true when taking into account the fact that 
‘French-listed firms are most controlled’. As a result, the ‘proposition of outside 
directors on the board is likely to be relatively weak’ (Lakhal, 2007:  68). Hence, 
it is important to revisit this evidence by including board composition in our 
models.   
INSIDER OWNERSHIP 
 
Li et al. (2008) examine the association between voluntary disclosure and 
insider ownership. They find a negative association between the two variables. 
Their finding suggests that UK companies with closely-held ownership have less 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders.  This result is 
consistent with the findings of Cormier et al. (2005) and Brammer and Pavelin 
(2006). However, it is inconsistent with Patelli and Prencipe (2007) who find a 
positive association between the two variables. It is also worth noting that Eng 
and Mak (2003) did not find any statistically significant relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and insider ownership. 
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the following hypotheses to 
examine the effect of firm characteristics and corporate governance on future-
oriented information in annual report narratives:  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the size of the firm and the level of 
future- oriented information in its annual report narratives. 
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H2: There is a positive relationship between firm's leverage and the level of 
future- oriented information in its annual narratives. 
H3: There is a relationship between firm's profitability and the level of future- 
oriented information in its annual narratives. 
H4: There is a negative relationship between firm's risk and the level of future-
oriented information in its annual narratives. 
H5: There is a relationship between the number of outside directors on board 
and the level of future-oriented information in its annual narratives. 
H6: There is a negative relationship between closely-held ownership and the level 
of future-oriented information in its annual narratives. 
 
THE LINK BETWEEN DIVIDEND POLICY AND FUTURE-ORIENTED INFORMATION  
The link between dividend policy and future-oriented information has 
received much attention in recent years. For example, in a recent paper, 
Hussainey and Walker (2009) examine the extent to which future-oriented 
information and dividend propensity are substitute or complement forms for 
communicating the value relevant information to investors. They offer evidence 
that the two variables are substitutes. Their results are consistent with signalling 
theory, but not consistent with pecking order theory (Deshmukh, 2005). 
Signalling theory suggests that firms with higher levels of asymmetric 
information (i.e. lower levels of future-oriented information) are more likely to 
pay higher levels of dividends to signal their future prospects to current and 
potential investors. However, pecking order theory suggests that firms with 
higher levels asymmetric information (i.e. lower levels of future-oriented 
information) are more likely to be underinvested. To control the 
underinvestment situation, these firms are more likely to lower their dividends.  
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Prior US studies on the association between asymmetric information and 
dividends, such as Deshmukh (2003; 2005) and Li and Zhao (2008), still offer 
mixed results. Consequently, the association between dividend and levels of 
future-oriented information (as a measure of information asymmetry) remains a 
challenge and source of much debate. This association is, therefore, one of the 
main issues to be empirically examined within the current paper. Hence, it can 
be hypothesized that: 
H7: There is a relationship between dividend policy and the level of future-
oriented information in its annual narratives. 
It is worth noting that we controlled for other determinants of dividend policy, 
namely, we control for, firm size, borrowing ratio, profitability, risk, liquidity, 
growth opportunities , insider ownership, and nonexecutive directors. (for more 
discussion about these  variables please see Al-Najjar and Hussainey, 2009) 
 
SAMPLING DESIGN AND RESEARCH METHOD  
SAMPLING DESIGN  
Our paper examines the determinants of future-oriented information and 
the link between this information and dividend policy for UK listed companies 
at the London Stock Exchange for financial year-ends between January 1996 and 
December 2002. The sample period goes from 1996 to 2002 because we limit 
our analysis to all non-financial firms that have at least one annual report in an 
electronic format Dialog database. Dialog covers large cross-sectional annual 
reports only for this period of time. The total number of annual reports on 
Dialog for non-financial firms for this period of time is 8,098 firm-years. We 
match this sample with an updated version of the ICCSR UK Environmental & 
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Financial Dataset, which contained information for UK firms from 1996 till 2002.
2
  It is 
worth noting that the  period of time investigated is the same as that used by Hussainey 
and Walker (2009). We use ICCSR database because it contains information about 
board size and board composition for a large number of firms. Financial firms are 
excluded from the analyses. The sample also excludes any firms with no financial and 
accounting records on Datastream or Worldscope. This gives us a final sample of 357 
non-financial firms (1860 firm-years) for the period from 1996 to 2002 inclusive.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS  
DETERMINANTS OF FUTURE-ORIENTED INFORMAITON 
 
This section reveals the empirical part of this paper and shows the 
applied econometrics models. This study applies three types of models, starting 
with the fixed effects model, then the random effects tobit model, and finally the 
random effects logit model. The reason behind using the tobit model is the fact 
that disclosure index has either a positive or zero values  which justifies using it.  
The logit model is applied to investigate the factors that affect the firm decision 
to disclose or conceal future-oriented information in the annual report narrative 
sections. The following model represents our fixed effects model: 
itD = i +   itX + it  
Where 
itD  is the future-oriented disclosure measure. 
  is the  Intercept coefficient of firm i. 
                                                          
2
 We wish to thank the International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility (ICCSR), 
Nottingham Business School Nottingham University (UK) for allowing us to use Datastream 
items 242 and 243 for our research projects.  
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  is the Row vector of slope coefficients of regressors. 
itX = is the Column vector of financial variables for firm i at time t, this vector is 
made up of the following: crossholding share, firm size, profitability of the firm 
(return on assets), non-executive directors, and firms beta. 
it  is the residual error for firm i at year t. 
The random tobit model can be expressed as 





 
otherwise                                                   0    =       
0>side hand-right  theif                                 + X + = D ititit 
 
 
In the tobit models, we use the same variables as those used in the fixed 
effects model. Finally, we use the logit model, which has a dependent variable of 
1 if the level of future-oriented information is greater than zero and 0 otherwise. 
Again, dependent variables are the same as those used for tobit and fixed effect 
models. 
 
THE LINK BETWEEN FUTURE-ORIENTED INFORMAITON AND DIVIDENDS 
 
Similarly, we identify the tobit, fixed effect and logit models to examine 
the association between dividends and future-oriented information in annual 
report narratives. In the analyses, we use dividend as the dependent variable and 
levels of future-oriented information in annual report narratives as the main 
independent variable. A set of control firm characteristics and corporate 
governance variables that are more likely to affect corporate dividend policy are 
also used. In accordance with Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009), firm risk, 
liquidity, growth opportunity, gearing, profitability, firm size, insider ownership 
and outside directorship on the board are controlled for.  
 13 
COUNT OF FUTURE-ORIENTED INFORMATION 
The same measure of disclosure quality developed in Hussainey et al. 
(2003) is adopted. They generate their disclosure scores for a large sample of 
UK annual reports automatically by using QSR N6 software. Their measure of 
disclosure quality is the number of future oriented statements in corporate annual 
report narrative sections that contain earnings-related topics. The same measure 
of disclosure is used within this research and also focuses on future earnings 
indicators. Hussainey et al. (2003), Schleicher et al. (2007), and Hussainey and 
Walker (2009) find that these indicators increase the stock market’s ability to 
foresee future earnings change.  
Similar to Hussainey et al. (2003), the disclosure score for the 
investigated sample is estimated in three steps. In the first step, the narrative 
sections of annual reports for future oriented information are researched. The list 
of future oriented information keywords created by Hussainey et al. (2003, p. 
277) is used. This list includes thirty-five keywords as follows: accelerate, 
anticipate, await, coming (financial) year(s), coming months, confidence (or 
confident), convince, (current) financial year, envisage, estimate, eventual, 
expect, forecast, forthcoming, hope, intend (or intention), likely (or unlikely), 
look forward (or look ahead), next, novel, optimistic, outlook, planned (or 
planning), predict, prospect, remain, renew, scope for (or scope to), shall, 
shortly, should, soon, will, well placed (or well positioned), year(s) ahead. 
Similar to Hussainey et al. (2003) the study takes into account the future year 
numbers in the list of future oriented keywords. In the second step, the relevant 
information to the stock market in assessing the firm’s future earnings is 
identified. For the purpose of the current paper, the same list created by 
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Hussainey et al. (2003, p. 280) that is related to earnings indicators is used. The 
list contains the following twelve keywords benefit, breakeven, budget, 
contribution, earnings, EPS, loss, margin, profit, profitability, return and 
trading. Finally, QSR N6 is applied to count the number of sentences that 
include both at least one future oriented keyword and at least one earnings 
indicator.  
OTHER VARIABLES DEFINATIONS  
Closely holding shares is the percentage of a firm's common stock held 
by insiders which acts as an index for insider power (Worldscope item no. 
08021). Firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. This measure includes 
tangible fixed assets, intangible assets investment, other assets, total stocks and 
work in process, total debtors and equivalent and cash and cash equivalents 
(Datastream item 392). We collect return on assets from Datastream as a 
measure of firm profitability. Datastream defines return on assets as net income 
plus interest on debt after tax divided by last year total assets.  Borrowing ratio is 
the total loans divided by equity capital and reserves minus total intangibles 
(Datastream item no. 733). Non-executive directors (ND) represent the 
percentage of board directors employed in non executive roles (Datastream item 
243). The Business risk measure is beta which is collected from Datastream. 
Our measure for liquidity is current assets to current ratio, Worldscope item no. 
08106). The measure of growth opportunity is Datastream item PTBV defined 
as the price divided by the book value or net tangible assets per share for the 
appropriate financial year end, adjusted for capital changes.  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the results of the panel-data with random and fixed 
effect regression analyses (with and without year dummies). It also presents the 
results of a logistic regression analysis. Given that the results on the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure in prior research are mixed, Table 1 might 
explain the reasons for the mixed results and offer a better picture of the 
association between corporate disclosure, firm characteristics and corporate 
governance structure.  
 
Hypothesis H1 predicts that there is a positive relationship between firm 
size and the levels of future-oriented information in annual report narratives. The 
results indicate that the coefficient of size is positive and statistically significant 
in the five regression models presented in Table 1. These results suggest that 
large UK firms are more likely to increase the level of future-oriented 
information in the annual report narratives than small firms. Therefore, we 
accept H1. 
 
Hypothesis H2 expects that there is a positive association between 
leverage and the levels of future-oriented information in annual report narratives. 
The results indicate that the coefficient on BORR is negative and statistically 
insignificant in the five regression models presented in Table 1. These results 
suggest that corporate level of leverage is not associated with the level of future-
oriented information in the annual report narratives. Hence, H2 is rejected. 
 
 16 
Hypothesis H3 anticipates that profitability will have an effect on the 
levels of future-oriented information in annual report narratives. The results 
indicate that the coefficient on ROA is negative and statistically significant in 
two of the five regression models presented in Table 1. These results suggest 
that it is not valid to conclude that unprofitable firms are more likely to produce 
higher levels of future-oriented information in the annual report narratives than 
profitable firms. Therefore, there is limited support for H3.. 
 
Hypothesis H4 forecasts that reporting future-oriented information in 
annual report narratives sections is associated with corporate risk. However, the 
coefficients on BETA are positive and negative (none is statistically significant) 
in the five regression models presented in Table 1. These results indicate that 
there is no association between risk and levels of future-oriented information in 
the annual report narratives. Hence, H4 is rejected. 
 
Hypothesis H5 expects an association between board composition and 
levels of future-oriented information in annual report narratives. The results 
indicate that the coefficients on NEXDR are positive and negative and 
statistically significant in two of the five regression models presented in Table 1. 
These results suggest that it is not credible to conclude that firms with large 
number or directors on board use more or less future-oriented information in the 
annual report narratives. Hence, there is limited support for H5. 
 
Hypothesis H6 predicts that insider ownership has an effect on levels of 
future-oriented information in annual report narratives. The results indicate that 
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the coefficients of CHS are positive and negative and statistically significant 
when we use the fixed effect tobit analyses (with or without years dummy). 
These results suggest that it is not feasible to conclude that firms with large 
portion of insider ownership use more or less future-oriented information in the 
annual report narratives. Therefore, there is limited support for H6. 
 
Finally, hypothesis H7 expects that there is an association between levels 
of future-oriented information and corporate dividend policy. Table 2 reports the 
results of the panel-data with fixed, random effect regression analyses as well as 
the logistic regression analyses. Table 2 shows that there is a positive association 
between levels of future-oriented information in the annual report narrative 
sections and corporate dividend policy. This finding is consistent with pecking 
order theory. In particular, the theory suggests that firms with lower levels 
asymmetric information (i.e. higher levels of future-oriented information) are 
more likely to higher their dividends. This finding is inconsistent with signalling 
theory. This finding is consistent with that reported by Deshmukh (2005) on a 
sample of US companies. The result suggests that firms that pay dividends are 
more likely to increase the level of future-oriented information in their annual 
report narrative section. In this case, firms can use either dividends or disclosure 
to signal value-relevant information for the stock market participants.  
 
It is well known that dividend policy is considered as one of effective 
mechanisms that can be used by managers to mitigate agency conflicts of 
interest within the firm (Bathala and Rao, 1995). Increasing levels of future-
oriented information in the annual report narratives is considered as a mean to 
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reduce information asymmetry between managers and current and potential 
investors. Reducing asymmetric information should also help in reducing 
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders and hence reducing 
agency costs. To summarise, dividends and future-oriented disclosure are 
complement mechanisms used by UK listed companies to reduce agency costs. 
Based on these results, hypothesis H7 is accepted.  
Our control variables give the same results as those reported in the 
previous dividend policy literature. In particular, Table 2 shows mixed results 
for firm size and profitability (with positive and negative significant results). 
Risk is negatively related to dividend policy, suggesting that risky firms are less 
likely to pay dividends. Both corporate governance factors, insider ownership 
and nonexecutive directors, produce the expected negative sign, therefore, 
increasing the percentage of nonexecutive directors in the board; and the more 
the insider owners, the lower the need to pay dividends. These   results are 
consistent with Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009). 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, panel Tobit and Logit regression models are used to 
investigate the determinants of corporate future-oriented information in the 
annual report narrative sections. As hypothesized, the results indicate that firm 
size is the main determinant of future-oriented information for UK firms listed at 
the London Stock Exchange.   
The study also examines the association between future-oriented 
information and dividend policy. As expected, a positive association is reported 
between the two variables. The findings indicate that firms with higher levels 
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of future-oriented information exhibit lower levels of information asymmetry 
and hence higher levels of dividends. This result is in line with picking order 
theory, but inconsistent with signalling theory. 
It is important to note that the findings of our research should be interpreted in 
light of limiting our study to the year 2002. However, new reporting rules for 
narrative disclosure (i.e. operating and finance review) have been issued. 
Therefore, future studies are needed to examine the same research issues for 
years beyond 2002. In addition, further research is needed to consider the effect 
of other corporate governance variables (i.e. audit committee characteristics) on 
levels of future-oriented information. Finally, the current study uses data from 
UK non-financial firms: further studies are needed to examine the extent to 
which the current results are applicable for financial companies or other 
countries.  
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Table (1): Determinants of Future-Oriented Narrative Reporting 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Fixed-effects models Random-effects tobit models Random-
effects 
logistic 
model 
Without 
years 
dummy 
With years 
dummy 
Without 
years 
dummy 
With years 
dummy 
Intercept -6.378942** -.0221179 -8.375315*** -7.765003*** .4352021 
Size .8740846*** .3977313* 1.110618*** 1.044464*** .4151392*** 
BORR -.0012396 -.0004371 -.0008001 -.0003232 -.0007085 
ROA -.0195327* -.0069005 -.0170527* -.0077538 -.0040131 
Beta .1545213 .18917 -.0381649 -.0432862 -.0161433 
NEXDR .1638046 -2.043972* -.7486529 -1.721843* -.2976772 
CHS .1270611** .1403545** .0632107 .0688869 -.1413472 
Observations 1860 1860 1860 1860 1860 
F-Value 5.33*** 5.50***    
Wald chi2(8)   132.48 157.97 14.16 
Prob > chi2   0.0000 0.0000 0.0279 
Size = Log total asset; BORR= Borrowing ratio; ROA = Return on Assets; BETA= Firm Risk 
for the firm; NEXDR = The number of outside directorships on boards; CHS = Closely held 
shares. The significance levels are: * = 10 percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.  
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Table (2): Future-Oriented Narrative Reporting and Dividend Policy 
                   
Independent 
Variables 
Fixed-effects models Random-effects tobit models Random-
effects 
logistic 
model 
Without 
years 
dummy 
With years 
dummy 
Without 
years 
dummy 
With years 
dummy 
Intercept 3.934007*** 3.980554*** 2.412632*** 2.23459** 1.831927 
Future Disclosure .0131378* .0129369* .0148202* .0152126* .1936827*** 
SIZE -.1850791*** -.189934** -.0788344 -.0673784 .5902575** 
BORR .000354 .0001121 .0002692 .0000381 .0223444 
ROA -.0104139*** -.0106118*** -.0087241** -.0094453*** .1358564*** 
Beta .0941989 .1140728 .1233792 .1393037 -1.352552*** 
LIQ -.037615 -.0352308 -.0377479 -.0361549 -.3852685 
MTBV .0000231 .0000211 .0000239 .0000165 -.0006447 
CHS -.0684596*** -.0680216*** -.0582569*** -.058235*** -.0222109 
NEXDR -.2827165 -.2889346 -.1753319 -.1036647 -4.547272** 
Observations 1704 1704 1704 1704 1704 
F-Value 3.53*** 2.63***    
Wald chi2(8)   23.74 31.55 58.92 
Prob > chi2   0.0047 0.0074 0.0000 
 Future Disclosure = Number of future-oriented sentences in the annual report narratives; Size 
= Log total asset; BORR= Borrowing ratio; ROA = Return on Assets; BETA= Firm Risk for 
the firm; LIQ = liquidity ratio; MTBV = market to book value; CHS = Closely held shares. 
NEXDR = The number of outside directorships on boards; The significance levels are: * = 10 
percent, ** = 5 percent, *** = 1 percent.  
 
 
